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Corporate Governance in Japanese Law:
Recent Trends and Issues
Hideki Kanda*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses recent trends and issues concerning
corporate governance in Japanese law. In the following article,
"corporate governance" refers to publicly-held business corporations.
Where this article refers to that in the stock exchange and listed firms,
it means the Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE") and the listed firms
whose stocks are listed on the markets of the TSE.
There is a vast body of academic research on corporate
governance in Japan and other jurisdictions, and in practice,
corporate governance is in a state of flux. Thus, it is not possible in
this article to discuss all aspects of corporate governance in Japan.
The purpose of this article, however, is to offer brief overviews on
selected topics, including empirical studies, recent scandals, board
structure, rule making by the stock exchange, disclosure rules under
Japanese securities regulation, and the forthcoming reform of
Japanese corporate law.
At the outset, a brief note on corporate law and securities
regulation in Japan may be noteworthy. Firms incorporated in Japan
whose stocks are listed on the TSE are subject to the Companies Act
of 2005, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 1948
("FIEA"), and the rules promulgated by the TSE.
In Japan, the Companies Act (effective from May 1, 2006)
applies to all joint-stock companies. The Companies Act provides for

* Professor of Law, University of Tokyo. This article is based on my presentation at the
Corporate Governance Conference at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
on October 18, 2013. I thank Professor Setsuo Miyazawa and the participants in the conference
for their helpful comments.
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private law rules about joint-stock companies. The Act is a
consolidation of the statutes that existed in 2005 in respect of
corporate law rules governing joint-stock companies in Japan. Until
such consolidation, corporate law rules were codified primarily as
part of the Commercial Code of 1899. The Commercial Code is of
German origin, but as far as the rules on business corporations are
concerned, it transplanted many American rules after World War II.'
Today, the Companies Act also reflects numerous amendments made
in the past decades to the Commercial Code and contains the result of
such historical developments in Japan. Thus, the Companies Act
today exhibits its own, somewhat unique, landscape2
FIEA applies to large publicly held companies.3 The name of the
Act was changed to its present name by the amendments in 2006
(effective from September 30, 2007). Until then, the Act was called
the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEA"). The SEA was modeled on
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
but again, it reflects the unique historical developments in Japan in
the past decades. The Act, therefore, has its own characteristics not
identical to the rules in the U.S.
Sometimes, the Companies Act and the FIEA regulate the same
matters. For instance, both Acts require public companies to prepare
financial statements and have them audited by professional auditors.
In usual practice, companies prepare those documents and have them
audited at one time so as to satisfy the requirements under both Acts.
The Companies Act is a private law, and there is no
administrative branch or agency of government that enforces the
rules under the Companies Act. As an exception, public registry
offices are understood to enforce the rules applied to the matters that
must be registered, but this is not discussed in this article. Of course,

1. See, e.., Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of CorporateLaw: Evidence and
ExplanationsFrom Japan and the UnitedStates, 150U.PA. L. REV. 527 (2001).
2. See, e.., Hideki Kanda, UnderstandingRecent Trends RegardingLiabilities of
lanagers and Directors in Japanese Corporate Law,. 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR JAPANISCHES
RECHT 29 (2004).
3. A company whose securities are listed on a stock exchange, traded "over the counter,"
or the number of whose registered shareholders is five hundred or more, is subject to the
periodic reporting requirements of the FlEA. A company that has made a public offering is also
subject to the same reporting requirements.
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the courts enforce the rules of the Companies Act. In contrast, the
FIEA has an administrative body of the government, the Financial
Services Agency ("FSA"), and an enforcement body, the Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission. The FIEA is also enforced
by the courts.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In recent years, a number of empirical studies have been
conducted concerning corporate governance in Japan.
A. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The area of takeover defenses is complicated with respect to the
law's coverage. The FIEA regulates tender offer processes, while
most of the defense measures raise legal issues under the Companies
Act, not the FIEA. In this sense, the distinction between the FIEA
and the Companies Act roughly corresponds to that between the
federal (and state) securities law and state corporate law in the
United States. It is interesting to note that the validity of some of the
defenses was challenged before the courts. In those cases, the relevant
issues were the ones under the Companies Act, not the FIEA.4 In
fact, the current tender offer regulation under the FIEA permits the
target company to adopt a defense action even after the
commencement of a tender offer by a hostile bidder. Thus, like in
Delaware, case law under the Companies Act shapes the landscape,
although the substance of the case law is not identical between
Delaware and Japan.
In a well-known case that occurred in May 2007, Steel Partners, a
U.S. buy-out fund, commenced a hostile tender offer for all
outstanding shares of Bulldog Sauce, a Worchester sauce producer
and a listed company on the TSE. Bulldog Sauce did not have any
"pre-bid" defense plans. As a post-bid defense, the board of directors

4. See generally Kenichi Osugi, Transplantinz Poison Pills in Foreign Soil: Japan's
Experiment, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 36 (Hideki Kanda
et al., eds., 2008).
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of Bulldog Sauce intended to issue stock warrants to all shareholders,
including Steel Partners and its affiliates (collectively "SP"), with the
condition that SP could not exercise the warrants. The warrants had a
redemption feature, by which the warrant holders other than SP
would receive common stocks in exchange for turning the warrants
into the company, whereas SP would receive cash. Thus, the scheme
was structured as a scheme diluting the voting right of SP without
imposing an economic loss on SP (not including the value of the
voting right). The Bulldog Sauce board introduced the proposal at the
annual shareholders' meeting on June 24, 2007, and shareholders
holding more than eighty percent of the total shares approved the
plan. SP sued to enjoin the issuance of the warrants. The Tokyo
District Court ultimately held on June 28, 2007, that the scheme was
valid. s The decision was affirmed by the Tokyo High Court on July 9,
2007,6 and then by the Supreme Court on August 7, 2007.' The
relevant issues were the ones under the Companies Act, and not the
FIEA.8
Also, a number of public firms in Japan have one of the two
types of "pre-bid" defense plans. As of September 10, 2012, 2,275
firms were listed on the TSE, and 441 out of those 2,275 listed firms
(14.9 percent) had pre-bid defense plans. 9
Pre-bid defense plans take two forms. The first is a typical trustbased scheme, where the firm issues stock warrants to a trust bank
with designating shareholders as beneficiaries of the trust. A hostile
bid triggers the defense plan, and the trust bank transfers the

5. See Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd.,
1805 SHOJI HOMU 43 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 28, 2007).

6. See Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd.,
1805 SHOJI HOMU 40 (Tokyo High Ct., July 9, 2007).
7. 1809 SHOJI HOMU 16 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2007).

8. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). See also Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan's New

Anti-takeover Defense Guidelines,PartIT The Role of Courts as Expositor and lonitor of the
Rules of the Takeover Game, 3 U. TOKYO J.L. & POL. 102 (2006); Hideki Kanda, Takeover
Defenses and the Role of Lait: A Japanese Perspective,in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 413 (Michel Tison et al., 2009).
9. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2013 95

(2013), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje6OOOOOO5obl-att/b7gje600000
3ukm8.pdf [hereinafter TSE WHITE PAPER 2013].
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warrants to the shareholders. The warrants have a discriminatory
feature and the bidder has no right to exercise them, as the terms and
conditions of the warrants usually provide that the warrants are not
exercisable by the shareholders who own twenty percent or more of
the firm's outstanding stocks.10 This plan is not popular today. The
second, more popular plan is called the advance-warning plan. This
plan varies from company to company but its typical style is as
follows. The board, sometimes with the approval of the shareholders'
meeting, makes a public announcement that if a shareholder attempts
to increase its stake to twenty percent or more of the firm's
outstanding stocks, the shareholder is first required to disclose and
explain, in accordance with the details specified in the announcement,
its intent to hold such stake and what the shareholder would do for
the firm. If the shareholder does not answer these questions or if the
target board thinks the shareholder's explanation is unsatisfactory,
then a defense measure would be triggered. Such defense measure is
typically to issue stock warrants to all shareholders; however, the
shareholder having twenty percent or more cannot exercise the
warrants. Instead, the shareholder can redeem her warrants at a fair
price at the option of the company. Thus, a warrant issuance typically
has the effect of "cashing out" the hostile bidder.
It is interesting to note that under the Companies Act, it is
possible to establish defense plans that rely on different classes of
shares. For instance, a firm may issue a special class of stock that does
not have voting power for the part of the stock exceeding the twenty
percent stake of all outstanding stocks. To issue such stocks, the
Companies Act requires the firm to provide details of such stocks in
the firm's charter. A firm issuing common stocks may convert them
into such special class stocks by a charter amendment, which requires
two-thirds approval at the shareholders' meeting. However, in
practice no company has introduced such class stocks. There is
discussion in academia as to whether such stocks are always lawful.
10. See Kanda, supra note 8, at 419.
11. Note, however, that after the report by the Corporate Value Study Group at the
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry on June 30, 2008 took a general position against
paying compensation to hostile bidders for their economic loss they may suffer when the
defense action is triggered, advance warning plans generally do not provide such payment.
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The TSE takes the view that such stocks are not appropriate for
existing listed firms, as opposed to firms making IPs.2
Thus, the Companies Act is important for the critical issues in
the area of hostile takeovers and defenses, and courts play an
important role in applying the relevant rules under the Companies
Act. The TSE also plays an important role in shaping the landscape in
this area, since such issues are not directly regulated by the FIEA,
and thus, there is no room for their enforcement by the FSA.
As noted above, beginning in 2005, some listed firms adopted
pre-bid defense plans against hostile takeovers in the form of advance
warning defense plans noted above. There is an empirical study
showing that a positive correlation was found between firms that
adopted defense plans in 2005 and firms that showed poor economic
performance. 13 The authors report that such correlation was not
found for firms that adopted defense plans in 2006.14 Note that for the
firms that adopted defense plans in 2005, causality is not entirely
clear. In other words, whether the adoption of defense plans led to
poor performance remains to be seen. It may be that firms with poor
performance tend to expose themselves to hostile bids and so
introduced defense plans.
B. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
As will be described later, under the current Companies Act in
Japan, independent directors are not required for "two-board
companies," which is the most popular board structure among listed
firms in Japan. In fact, 97.8 percent of the listed firms on the TSE as
of September 10, 2012, were two-board companies, and the remaining
5
2.2 percent were "one-board and three-committee companies. ,
Whether independent directors play a positive role in corporate

12. See

generaly TOKYO

STOCK EXCH.,

INTERIM REPORT OF ADVISORY GROUP ON

IMPROVEMENTS TO TSE LISTING SYSTEM (2007), available at www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/Is-

improvements/b7gje600000044iq-att/full-text.pdf.
13. See Sumio Hirose et al., Information Effects of Performance b the Adoption of
Takeover Defenses: An Analisis of the Cases,1826 SHOJIHOMU 4 (2008) (in Japanese).
14. See id.
15. See TSE WHITE PAPER 2013, supra note 9, at 15.
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governance has been much debated, and several empirical studies on
the subject have been conducted. As to whether there are
correlations between having outside directors and firm performance,
16
the results of those studies are split.
It is interesting to note, however, that empirical studies in recent
years try to examine the determinants of board composition. They try
to identify factors that may affect the optimal board structure. The
hypothesis is that more diversified firms with more branches need
directors with different backgrounds and expertise and that firms
requiring special knowledge and skills need a greater number of
inside directors. Recent empirical studies concerning independent
directors in the United States imply that the situation in the United
States is consistent with this hypothesis, while empirical
studies
17
concerning outside directors in Japan imply the opposite.
C.

LISTING OF SU3SIDIARIES

While most listed firms on the TSE do not have parent
companies, some of them do. Out of 2,275 TSE-listed companies, 356
companies (15.6 percent) have controlling shareholders. Out of these,
67.7 percent (10.6 percent overall) have parent companies, and 32.3
percent (5.1 percent overall) have controlling shareholders other than
parent companies. Of the companies with parent companies, 89.6
percent (9.5 percent overall) have listed parent companies. According

16. Compare Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramsever, Outside Directors and Shareholder's
Interest, in HOW TO USE ECONOMICS -INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY 227 (2007) (in Japanese) ifith Konari Uchida, The Determinants of the
Ratio of Outside DirectorsandFirmPerformance,50 SEC. ANALYSTS J. 8 (2012) (in Japanese);

Takuji Saito, The Determinants and the Effects ofHaving Outside Directorsin JapaneseFirms,
in
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
IN
JAPAN -TOWARD
REDESIGNING
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND THE RECOVERY OF COMPETITIVENESS 181 (Hideaki Miyajima ed., 2011)

(in Japanese); Hideaki Miyajima & Ryo Ogawa, How to Understand the Change in the
Composition of the Board of Directorsin Japan,1973 SHOJIHOMU 81 (2012) (in Japanese).
17. See Tomotaka Fujita, Corporate Governance and the Rule of Soft Lawt, 5 U. TOKYO
SOFT L. REv. 9 (2013). For the studies in the United States, see, e.g., James S. Linck et al., The
Determinants of Board Structure, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 308 (2008); Kenneth Lehn et al.,
Determinants of the Size and Structure of CorporateBoards: 1935-2000, 38 FIN. MGMT. 747
(2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance
Research, 23 REv. OF FIN. STUD. 939 (2010).
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to the TSE, the reason for the large percentage of parent companies
being listed is due to the TSE requiring, until January 1, 1996,
subsidiaries seeking a new listing to have a TSE-listed parent.
According to the TSE, another reason is that the burden on an
unlisted parent to list its subsidiary -namely, the TSE Securities
Listing Rules requiring a TSE-listed company to perform disclosure
regarding its unlisted parent company at a level similar to that for a
listed company.1 8 Note that as to subsidiaries listed on the TSE that
have parent companies (whether they are listed or not), the TSE
imposes a set of rules that are not required by the Companies Act.1 9
Recent empirical studies tend to indicate that the economic
performance of those listed subsidiaries is not consistently worse than
other listed firms)20
D. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

Whether shareholder activism plays a positive role in corporate
governance is also a topic that has been debated worldwide. There
are empirical studies on this topic, and their implications seem
somewhat unclear)1'
III. SCANDALS
Scandals occur everywhere around the globe, and Japan is not an
exception. The most well-known scandal in Japan in recent years may
be the accounting fraud by Olympus that was discovered in 2011.22
Other well-known scandals in Japan include the private use of firm
18. See TSE WHITE PAPER 2013, supra note 9, at 22.
19. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., LISTING RULES: ARTICLE 441-2 (2009) (Uukashoken
jojokitei, effective June 30, 2010, requiring fairness opinions and disclosure for transactions
between a listed subsidiary company and its controlling shareholder).
20. See Hideaki Miyajima et al., An Economic Analisis of Parentand Subsidiari Listings,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INJAPAN, supra note 16, at 289.
21. See Yasushi Hamao et al., U.S.-St Ile Investor Activism in Japan: The First Ten Years,
(Marshall Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. FBF 06-10, 2010). See also John Buchanan, Dominic
Heesang Chai & Simon Deakin, HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN-THE LIMITS OF
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
22. See FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE (2012),
available athttp://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/kachoukin/05/2012/lI.pdf (in Japanese).
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assets by the chairman of Daio-Seishi, and the disappearance
outside Japan of pension assets managed by AIJ, a pension fund
management company. 4 Also, scandals concerning insider trading
relating to seasoned stock issuance in 2012 led to the amendments
to
5
2013.2
in
trading
insider
of
regulation
the
the FIEA concerning
It may be noted that lawyers tend to view corporate governance
as a mechanism to prevent fraud and other scandals, while economists
tend to view it as a mechanism to increase firm performance. Thus,
the empirical studies noted above examined the correlations between
corporate governance and firm performance. There are almost no
empirical studies examining the relationship between corporate
governance and the prevention of fraud and scandals.
IV. BOARD STRUCTURE
The Companies Act permits a choice between a two-board
company and a one-board and three-committee company. In the
former, a board of directors and a board of statutory auditors are
required, while in the latter (Jinkai-to secchi gaisha), there are no
statutory auditors and the board of directors is required to have three
committees-a nominating committee, an audit committee, and a
compensation committee (Article 400 through Article 417 of the
Companies Act). This latter form was introduced by the amendments
to the Commercial Code in 2002 (effective from April 1, 2003). More
than half of each committee's members must be "outside" directors.
For two-board companies, at least half of the members of the board
of statutory auditors must be "outside" statutory auditors, but the
board of directors does not have to have outside directors. In
practice, one-board and three-committee companies are not popular
as far as the number of firms that adopt that form. As noted above,

23. See FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE (2011),
available athttp://www .daio-paper.co.jp/news/2011/pdf/n231(P0a.pdf (in Japanese).
24. See SECS. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BASED ON FINDINGS OF THE INSPECTION OF AIJ INVESTMENT ADVISORS

Co., LTD. (2012), availableathttp://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/news/reco/ 20120705-1.htm.
25.

See FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, EXPLANATORY MATERIALS ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE

FIEA (2013), available at http://www.fsa.go.j p/common/ diet/ 183/setsumei.pdf (in Japanese).
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only 2.2 percent of the listed firms on the TSE as of September 10,
2012, are one-board and three-committee companies. z6
A brief further note on two-board companies may be
worthwhile, because statutory auditors are not well-known outside
Japan. The Companies Act begins with the familiar position that
shareholders are the owners of a joint-stock company. A
shareholders' meeting elects directors and makes decisions about
"fundamental changes" to the company, such as a merger, a sale of
substantially all the firm's assets, and an amendment to the firm's
charter. For a two-board company, there must be at least three
directors. Directors are elected at the shareholders' meeting, and
form the board of directors. The board elects representative directors,
the Japanese counterparts of U.S. officers or executives. There must
be at least one representative director. Representative directors are
the management, and they run the company. The Companies Act
requires that the board of directors make the important corporate
decisions and supervise the management. Each director, as a member
of the board, owes a duty of care and loyalty to the company. The
director's liability to the company may be enforced by shareholders
through a derivative action. Shareholders have familiar rights, such as
the right to make proposals, the right to ask questions to directors
and statutory auditors (although the Companies Act calls this the
director's or auditor's "duty to explain"), and the right to examine the
company's books and records.
A two-board company must have "kansayaku," often (somewhat
misleadingly) translated as a statutory auditor27 Statutory auditors
are elected at the shareholders' meeting, and do not have to be
accountants or other professionals. A "large company," which is
defined under the Companies Act as a joint-stock company having
either legal capital in the amount of 500 million yen or more, or total

26. TSE WHITE PAPER 2013, supra note 9.
27. The Japan Audit and Supervisory Board Members Association ("JASBA") (Nihon
Kansayaku Kyokai) recommends that kansaiaku be translated into English as audit and
supervisory board member and kansaaku-kai as audit and supervisory board. See JASBA,
NEW RECOMMENDED ENGLISH TRANSLATION FOR "KANSAYAKU" AND "KANSAYAKU-KAI"

(Oct. 2012), available at http://www.kansa.or.jp/en/ns121023.pdf. In this article, I keep the
traditional translation and use -statutory auditor" and the "board of statutory auditors."
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debt (on balance sheet) in the amount of twenty billion yen or more,
must have at least three statutory auditors, and at least half of them
must be "outside" statutory auditors. An auditor is "outside" when he
or she does not, or did not in the past, serve as a director or employee
of the company or its subsidiary (Article 2(16) of the Companies
Act). In a large company, there must be at least one full-time auditor.
In addition, a large company must have an accounting auditor
(kaikeikansanin), who must be a certified public accountant or
certified auditing firm. An accounting auditor is elected at the
shareholders' meeting, and is responsible for auditing the company's
financial statements annually before they are submitted to the annual
shareholders' meeting, where the audit opinion is also submitted. In
contrast, a statutory auditor is responsible for overseeing the activities
of management. This is understood to mean confirming the legality of
management's activities. The Companies Act requires collaboration
between accounting auditors and statutory auditors, providing
complex rules, the details of which are beyond the scope of this
article.
A two-board company may elect an outside director, although
this election is not mandatory. If the company has an outside director,
the Companies Act permits some special treatment-for instance,
decision-making on certain important matters may be delegated from
the board of directors to a smaller special board (see Article 373 of
the Companies Act). A director is "outside" where he or she is not, or
was not, an executive director or employee of the company or its
subsidiary (Article 2(15) of the Companies Act).
There are two recent trends in this area. First, as noted below,
the TSE today requires listed firms to have at least one
"independent" director or auditor and encourages all listed firms to
have independent directors. Second, as noted below, the Companies
Act is expected to be amended in 2014. Under the Bill for the
Amendments to the Companies Act, the definition of "outside" is
stricter than under the current law, and having outside directors
satisfying the new definition of "outside" is encouraged by
introducing a so-called comply or explain rule.
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V. STOCK EXCHANGE RULES
The TSE has been active in providing rules concerning corporate
governance for listed companies. 8 In particular, on August 24, 2009,
the TSE introduced a rule concerning new stock issuance to a third
party where increased disclosure and explanations are required for
the reason why the firm does such issuance2 9 Also, on December 30,
2009, the TSE adopted a new rule requiring listed firms to have at
least one independent director or statutory auditor, whose name must
be notified to the TSE every year. 30 The definition of "independent"
under the TSE rule is stricter than the definition of "outside" under
the Companies Act. In the latter, "outside" means lack of an
employment relationship with the company and its subsidiaries in the
past, whereas in the former, "independent" means, in addition to
being an outsider required under the Companies Act, lack of an
employment relationship with the company's parent firms, lack of a
family relationship, and lack of a business or trade relationship.31
In practice, the TSE White Paper 2013 reports that the average
number of directors per TSE-listed company was 8.13 persons overall.
In the 2006 survey, this was 8.99 persons per company, and the trend
of decreasing figures since the survey began has continued. This
overall trend of decreasing number of directors is also affected by the
structure of the board of directors. There are six companies that have
more than twenty directors and two of these do not have any outside
director. In contrast, there are 472 companies that have no more than
five directors. Among them, six companies have more statutory
auditors than directors, and the size of the board of directors is equal
to the size of the board of statutory auditors in seventy-nine
companies; and the number of directors exceeds the number of
statutory auditors by only one person in 206 companies. Furthermore,
28. See generallv Improvements to TSE Listing Sistem, TOKYO STOCK EXCH.,
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/ls-improvements/index.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2010).
29. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., LISTING RULES: ARTICLE 432 (2009) (effective Aug. 24,
2009).
30. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., LISTING RULES: ARTICLE 436-2 (2009) (effective Dec. 30,

2009, amended on June 30, 2010).
31. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., GUIDELINES ON LISTING III-(3)-2 (2009) (effective Dec. 30,

2009).
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upon dividing the number of directors by the number of statutory
auditors, 1,246 companies have no more than double, including 461
companies with no more than 1.5 times, indicating a decreasing trend
despite a3 certain presence of statutory auditors compared to
directors. 32
The TSE White Paper 2013 also reports that the aggregate
number of persons notified as independent directors or statutory
auditors is 4,815 persons, of which 4,651 persons are accounted for by
two-board companies, while 164 persons are accounted for by oneboard and three-committee companies. The average number of such
persons per listed company is 2.12. This is 2.09 persons at two-board
companies and 3.35 persons at one-board and three-committee
companies.33
VI. DISCLOSURE RULES UNDER
SECURITIES REGULATION
The disclosure rules under the FIEA were amended in March
2010. The current rules under "kaijinaikaku furel "promulgated by
the Financial Services Agency ("FSA") imposes on the reporting
companies (which include all listed firms) enhanced disclosure on
corporate governance. In particular, reporting companies are now
required to provide disclosure of the annual amount of executive
compensation for each individual where the annual amount is onehundred million yen or more.34 They also are now required to provide
disclosure of the result of voting at the resolutions of the
shareholders' meeting.
VII. FORTHCOMING REFORM OF CORPORATE LAW
A reform plan of the Companies Act was adopted by the
Legislative Council at the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") on September

32. See TSE WHITE PAPER 2013, supra note 9, at 22.
33. See TSE WHITE PAPER 2013, supra note 9, at 52.
34. See also id. at 69.
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7, 2012. 3' The Bill for the Amendments to the Companies Act ("the
Bill") was submitted to the Diet on November 29, 2013.36 It has not
yet been passed in the Diet, but is expected to be passed sometime in
2014.
First, the reform of outside directors is expected to be made. The
requirement of being outside will become stricter in two respects. In
addition to the requirement of lack of an employment relationship
with the company or its subsidiaries, lack of an employment
relationship with the company's parent firms will be required (Article
2(15) and Article 2(16) of the Bill). 37 Also, lack of a family
relationship will be required (Article 2(15) and Article 2(16) of the
Bill). Note, however, that lack of a business or trade relationship,
required by the current TSE rule for independence, will not be
required under the new regime of the Companies Act. Aside from
this, having an outside director is encouraged by a comply or explain
rule. Specifically, all two-board companies are to be subject to a rule
where they must explain the reason why they do not have an outside
director, if they do not have one, at the annual shareholder's meeting
(Article 327-2 of the Bill). In addition, under an MOJ rule, such
explanation is expected to be required to be made in the annual
business report (jigyo hokoku) and in the materials in connection
with the election proposals of directors at the shareholders' meeting
(kabunushi-sokaisanko-shorul).38 In this connection, it is interesting
to note that the Legislative Council of the MOJ also made a strong
request to stock exchanges that they encourage listed firms to have

35. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MAIN POINTS FOR THE REFORM
OF CORPORATE LAW (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000102013.pdf

(in Japanese). For an explanation and analysis of the Main Points in English, see also Gen Goto,
The Outline for the Companies Act Reform in Japan and Its Implications,35 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
JAPANISCHES RECHT 13, 14 (2013).
36. The Bill and related materials are available online. See Billfor the Amendments to the
Companies Act, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJIminji07_00138.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014) (in Japanese).
37. The Bill relaxes the employment requirement in that the definition of outside is
satisfied if an employment relationship did not exist for ten years preceding the appointment of
the person as an outside director or outside statutory auditor. See Article 2(15) and Article
2(16) of the Bill.
38. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 35.
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outside directors.3 9
Second, a new type of company is expected to be introduced as
"kansa-to iinkal sechi aisha," a company with a one-board and onecommittee structure (where there are no statutory auditors and the
majority of the committee members must be outside directors)
(Article 399-2 through Article 399-14. of the Bill). As a result, listed
firms will have the choice of three board structures: (i) two boards,
(ii) one board and three committees, and (iii) one board and one
committee. This one-board and one-committee structure is intended
to encourage listed firms with a two-board structure to move to that
structure and thereby have outside directors.40
Third, for public companies, a large-scale stock issuance that
would create controlling shareholding (that is, majority holding of
votings stocks) will, in principle, require approval at the shareholders'
meeting (Article 206-2 of the Bill). The technical operation of this
new rule is complicated and not discussed here.
Finally, in parent-subsidiary situations, a so-called multi-layer
shareholder derivative action will be introduced, although it is to be
recognized under limited circumstances. Under the new regime,
where a director of a subsidiary owes liability to the subsidiary, a
shareholder of its one-hundred percent parent company (if he or she
has one percent or more of the voting stocks for six months or
otherwise satisfies specified conditions) will be given the right to sue
the director of the subsidiary in the form of a derivative action (if the
subsidiary is large enough to account for more than twenty percent on
the parent's balance sheet or otherwise satisfies specified conditions)
(Article 847-3 of the Bill).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2008, I explored the question of what shapes corporate law in

39. Id. On the date when the bill was submitted to the Diet, the TSE made an
announcement in that direction. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., REVISIONS TO LISTING RULES
CONCERNING SECURING HIGHLY INDEPENDENT

OUTSIDE DIRECTORS (2013),

available at

http://www.tse.or.jp/english/about/rules/comment/b7gje6000001sb2p-att/b7gje600010sbcb.pdf.
40. See Hideki Kanda, Reform of the Companies Act, 169 Ho no Shihai 8 (2013) (in
Japanese).
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Japan.41 In the United States, whether Delaware corporate law is the
result of the "race to the bottom" or the "race to the top" has been
much debated. In 2005, Professor Mark Roe reminded us of the
importance of the race between state corporate law and federal law.4 z
These debates have one thing in common: corporate law in the U.S.
has been shaped and developed through competition among
legislators. What about Japan'? Japan does not adopt a federal system,
and thus, there is only one set of corporate law in Japan. This simply
suggests that competition between states or between state and federal
legislators does not exist in Japan. Does this mean that there are no
competitors in Japanese corporate law'? Certainly, there are
competitors outside Japan, and indeed, Japanese corporate law has
been influenced by the corporate laws of other jurisdictions. More
generally, the familiar debate on convergence or divergence of
corporate laws around the world suggests that there is competition
among corporate laws worldwide. Yet, what about competition within
Japan'?
It is submitted that there is competition in shaping corporate law
within Japan, and that this competition is among enforcers.4 3 More
specifically, regulation, in particular, a set of rules commonly called
securities law or regulation, serves as a competitor to what is
commonly called corporate law in Japan. Today, stock exchange rules
and their enforcement serve as an additional competitor to corporate
law in Japan. How legal rules on corporate governance are shaped in
Japan and other jurisdictions would seem to remain an interesting
topic for a future research agenda.

41. Hideki Kanda,

What Shapes Corporate Law in Japan:?, in TRANSFORMING

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 60 (Hideki Kanda et al., eds., 2008).
42. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware"s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591 (2003); Mark J.
Roe, Delaware" Politics,118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005).
43. Kanda, supra note 41.

